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Abstract
The paper investigates how ex-ante uncertainty about a govern-
ment policy with redistributive consequences will inﬂuence the pro-
portion of agents in favor of it, if agents can trade policy contingent
securities. If a subset of agents can insure against policy uncertainty,
support for redistributive policies is always smaller than in a case
where no insurance is available. Both the relation between initial in-
equality and redistribution and the inequality of the expected income
distribution after policy uncertainty is resolved depend on the size
of the insurance market. Suggestive evidence for the existence and
the eﬀects of a “political insurance market” for the US economy are
provided.
1 Introduction
The relation between income distribution and citizens’ demand for redistri-
bution has received wide attention in the political economy literature. The
seminal paper of Meltzer and Richard (1981) presented a simple though ex-
tremely powerful argument: the more left-skewed the distribution of income,
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1the higher the political support for redistributive taxation. Unfortunately
this argument is not supported by the data. Perotti (1996) ﬁnds no cross-
country relation between pre-tax income inequality and adoption of redis-
tributive policies. Moreover, as pointed out by Benabou (2000) among oth-
ers, for advanced countries the relation may run in the opposite direction:
more equal societies tend to redistribute more rather than less.
A largely unexplored issue that has only recently attracted some attention
in the literature is whether citizens’ reaction to policy uncertainty plays any
role in understanding the relation between income distribution and the like-
lihood of adopting redistributive policies. Policy uncertainty may naturally
arise because electoral candidates run on diﬀerent platforms entailing diﬀer-
ent degrees of redistribution, and election results are uncertain (that is what
happened, for example, in the 2000 Presidential election in the US). Further-
more, even if a politician has already won the election running on a given
platform, there might still be uncertainty about the likelihood that he will be
able to implement his electoral promises (this is the case, for example, with
the health care reform that was at the center of Clinton’s 1992 Presidential
campaign but was defeated in Congress during his presidency). If agents are
risk averse and markets can provide some form of insurance against political
uncertainty, agents’ reaction to uncertainty will be an important component
of the equilibrium demand for redistributive policies, and, in turn, it will
aﬀect the ultimate success of these policies.
Musto and Yilmaz (forthcoming) derive an interesting result. If political
insurance markets are complete, meaning that every agent can trade policy
contingent securities, then people can perfectly hedge political uncertainty.
Therefore agents will be indiﬀerent between alternative policies and, as a
consequence, the distribution of resources in the economy would not aﬀect
political support for redistribution. In other words, variation in the demand
for redistribution would only be due to diﬀerences in ideological preferences.
While theoretically elegant, this result raises a conundrum. Is it reasonable
to think that the dramatic diﬀerences between redistribution levels in the
US economy as compared to most Western European countries, or changes
through time of US redistributive policies are solely driven by diﬀerent ideo-
logical tastes? Moreover, how does one explain the negative relation between
inequality and redistribution observed in the data?
In this paper we show that if participation in a political insurance mar-
ket is restricted to relatively rich agents, the demand for redistribution is
always smaller than in the case where no insurance is available. Both the
2relation between initial inequality and redistribution and the inequality of
the expected income distribution after policy uncertainty is resolved depend
on the size of the insurance market. In an economy with a developed po-
litical insurance market, there is less demand for redistribution than in an
economy without such a market, and demand for redistribution decreases as
income inequality increases. Moreover, the existence of a large political insur-
ance market increases future expected inequality even if a large proportion of
agents are actually redistributing resources through private transfers. There-
fore our model shows the role citizens’ reactions to policy uncertainty plays
in the demand for redistributive policies. Our analysis oﬀers new insights
on the relation between income distribution and support for redistributive
policies and is consistent with the relation between income inequality and
redistribution that characterizes advanced economies.
Two natural questions arise. First, do political insurance markets exist?
In particular, do existing ﬁnancial instruments allow agents to insure against
policy uncertainty? Second, taking for granted that not all citizens have
access to the stock market (e.g., because of credit constraints), is there an
empirical relation between level of participation in the market and support for
redistributive policies which is consistent with the predictions of the model?
To address the ﬁrst question, we show that stocks currently traded on the
market can actually be used to hedge policy risk. Focusing on the 2000 US
Presidential campaign, we construct two “presidential portfolios” composed
of selected stocks anticipated to fare diﬀerently under a Bush versus a Gore
presidency. To construct these portfolios we use data on campaign contri-
butions and select stocks of companies that made signiﬁcant contributions
to candidates’ campaigns in the 2000 election cycle and whose contributions
were concentrated on one particular candidate. We provide evidence, using
daily observations for the ﬁve months before the election took place, that the
excess returns of these portfolios with respect to overall market movements
are related to changes in electoral polls.
To address the second question, we analyze the relation between partic-
ipation in the stock market and support for redistributive policies both at
an aggregate and individual level. First, we show that in a cross section of
countries, there is a negative relation between aggregate stock ownership and
support for redistribution. Second, focusing on recent US experience, we pro-
vide evidence of a relation between the increase in stock market participation
over the last decade and the reduction of support for redistribution both in
terms of adopted redistributive policies and in terms of electoral support for
3the democratic party. Third, using micro data from the National Election
Study for the period 2000-2002, we show that stock ownership is negatively
related with preferences for redistribution after controlling for income, race,
sex, age, and education.
Before turning to the description of the model, we brieﬂy discuss the rela-
tion of our work to the existing literature. In addition to the paper of Musto
and Yilmaz (forthcoming) we discussed earlier, another strand of literature
that is related to our paper is Benabou (2000) and Roemer and Lee (1999).
T h e s em o d e l sg i v ed i ﬀerent theoretical explanations for the fact that income
inequality and redistribution can be negatively related. Benabou shows that
if redistribution is ex-ante welfare improving the support for redistribution
is U-shaped in inequality. Roemer and Lee show that public spending is not
necessarily increasing in inequality when there are asymmetries across agents
in the access to credit markets.
Celentani et al. (2003) analyze risk sharing and endogenous ﬁscal spend-
ing in the presence of complete markets. They show that if markets are
sequentially complete, ﬁscal policy can be used to manipulate future security
prices leading to ineﬃcient equilibrium allocations.
From an empirical point of view, Knight (2003) is one of the few papers
that investigates the relation between politics and the stock market. Unlike
our paper, the focus of Knight’s analysis is to test whether policy platforms
are capitalized into equity prices, using data from the 2000 US Presidential
election. He selects a sample of ﬁrms favored under the alternative policy
platforms using reports from ﬁnancial analysts, and shows that campaign
platforms matter for ﬁrms’ proﬁtability.
Using data from 1992 US Presidential election, Ayers et al. (2003) study
whether security prices reﬂect ﬁscal policy uncertainty. Feenberg and Poterba
(1991), Slemrod and Greimel (1998), and Erikson, Goolsbee, and Maydew
(2002) analyze the eﬀect of ﬁscal policy uncertainty in the market for munic-
ipal bonds. Herron et al. (1999) study the eﬀect of the 1992 US Presidential
election outcome on the proﬁtability of diﬀerent economic sectors. Finally,
Pantzalis et al. (2000) investigate the behavior of stock market indices for a
cross section of countries in the period around national elections.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents
as i m p l i ﬁed version of the model showing the main eﬀect of the political
insurance market on agents’ behaviors. Section 3 contains the general equi-
librium model. Section 4 deals with the eﬀects of the political insurance
market on the inequality of the expected income distribution after policy
4uncertainty is resolved. Section 5 presents evidence for the hypothesis that
election related portfolios can be constructed. Section 6 investigates the rela-
tion between participation in the stock market and support for redistributive
policies. Conclusions and some avenues for further research are presented in
section 7.
2A n E x a m p l e
Consider a very simple one period model with three agents and logarithmic
utility function over wealth. The initial endowments are y = {h,m,l},w i t h
h>m>l ,a n dm<h+m+l
3 =¯ y. Agents have to choose between two diﬀerent
alternatives: the status quo, and a reform that taxes wealth proportionally
at rate τ and redistributes τ¯ y to every agent. The reform will be adopted if
the majority is in favor of it.
There is ex-ante uncertainty about the proportion of agents in favor of
the reform and, following Roemer (2001) we assume that agents estimate
this proportion with an additive error captured by the random variable ε.






, with symmetric density g(·) and distribution
function G(·),s u c ht h a tG(0) = 1
2.G i v e n t h a t m<¯ y, the only agent
that is strictly worse oﬀ with the reform is y = h. Therefore, the expected















Suppose now, that before voting over the reform a ﬁnancial market is
open. Agents can trade any quantity by of a ﬁnancial security that pays 1 if
the reform is implemented and 0 otherwise.1 Let p be the price of the bond.
The maximization problem that agents solve is:
max
by
qln((y + by (1 − p))(1 − τ)+τ¯ y)+( 1− q)ln(y − byp)
and market clearing requires:
bl + bm + bh =0
1Nothing will change if b pays 0 if the reform is implemented and 1 otherwise.
5where by denotes the quantity of the security traded by the agent with income
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Notice that since the security is a fair insurance and every agent can access
the ﬁnancial market, in equilibrium the wealth in the two states has to be the
same. Every agent will be indiﬀerent and the ﬁnal probability of adopting
the reform will depend on the tie-breaking rule. Moreover, irrespective of
whether or not the reform is implemented, the ex post wealth distribution
will be:
y(1 − τq)+¯ yτq, y = {h,m,l}.
Therefore partial redistribution through private transfers will take place any-
way. This is the main result of Musto and Yilmaz (2003).
Consider now the case in which access to the ﬁnancial market is condi-
tional on having a given positive amount a of initial endowment. For example
assume that the poorest agent y = l cannot participate in the electoral mar-
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It is immediate to verify that in equilibrium every agent that can access the
market, namely y = {m,h}, will strictly prefer the status quo to the reform.
Therefore, the proportion ˜ q of agents that strictly prefer redistribution will
be:
















3(1−qτ)−(1−q)τ , in order to rule out corner solutions.
6Note that ˜ q is strictly smaller than q.
To see the intuition behind this result notice that if everybody has access
to the insurance market, the h agent can buy out m and l,b ym a k i n gt h e m
at most indiﬀerent between the two policies. If the poor agent cannot access
the market the resulting excess in demand will increase the equilibrium price.
A tt h en e wp r i c ea g e n tm is more than compensated by private transfers and
therefore she strictly prefers the status quo scenario. When access to market
is unrestricted all the risk is idiosyncratic and therefore insurable, whereas
if agent l cannot insure herself part of the risk becomes systematic. In the
redistribution state the l agent is extracting money form the two other agents
that will therefore strictly prefer the status quo.
Suppose now that, taking the mean ¯ y constant, we decrease h to h0 <h
and increase l to l0 >a>l . Assume, moreover that if indiﬀerent between
the two states agents will toss a fair coin. It is immediate to realize that
the probability of adopting the redistribution will increase even if, after the
experiment, the initial distribution of endowments is more equal. Clearly, in
this simple example, the result depends on the tie-breaking rule adopted.
In the following two sections we show that the conclusions obtained above
hold in a more general environment and explore the relation between inequal-
ity and the adoption of redistributive policies.
3 The Model
There is a continuum of agents of measure one. Each agent is endowed with
pre-tax income y ≥ 0, that is an independent draw from a known distribution





be the mean income.
Agents are called to vote on the adoption of a reform. Two alternatives
are available: the status quo versus a policy (τ,T),w h e r eτ is a proportional
tax on wealth and T is a lump sum transfer. We assume that the budget is
balanced, that is T = τ¯ y.
We use a (τ,T) policy as a convenient way to describe our results. The
implications of our analysis are however more general and hold for a wide
7class of policies which entail a conﬂict of interest between those who gain
from a policy and those who are hurt by it.
Ex-ante uncertainty about the proportion of agents in favor of the reform
is modeled as in the previous section. We further assume, without loss of






. The ex-ante probability
of adopting the redistribution policy is:
q =P r
½




= F (¯ y).
Before the election a ﬁnancial market opens. Agents can trade any quan-
tity b of a security that pays 1 in the case the reform is enacted and zero
otherwise. Let p be the security price and γ > 0 be an exogenous threshold
on pre-tax income above which agents have access to the market.3 Finally,
we assume that the utility function in wealth U (x) is twice continuously dif-
ferentiable, U0 (x) is homogeneous of degree r,a n dU0 (x) > 0, U00 (x) < 0.
Homogeneity of U0 (x) is only a suﬃcient condition for uniqueness of the equi-
librium. It can be easily shown that all the results hold for a much larger
set of preferences including, for example, the class of constant absolute risk
aversion (CARA) and constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) preferences.
The maximization problem that agents solve is:
max
b
qU ((y + b(1 − p))(1 − τ)+τ¯ y)+( 1− q)U (y − bp),
3Guiso et al. (2002) show that the proportion of US households investing in risky asset
with gross ﬁnancial wealth falling in the lowest quartile is 1.4%. This proportion is less
than 1% for UK, Netherlands and Italy, and less than 3% for Germany. If we consider
direct and indirect stockholding all ﬁgures are below 5%, with the unique exception of
Germany at 6.6%.
8and taking ﬁrst order conditions we get4:
U0 ((y + b(1 − p))(1 − τ)+τ¯ y)
U0 (y − bp)
=
(1 − q)p






Therefore in the unique equilibrium
b
∗ (y)=( y − ˜ y)
τ¯ y
(1 − τ)˜ y
1 − q(1 − (1 − τ)hr)




1 − q(1 − (1 − τ)hr+1)
where
h =





Y |y>γ ydF (y)
R
Y |y>γ dF (y)
≥ ¯ y
˜ y>γ.
Notice from the ﬁrst order conditions, that all agents that are active in the
market strictly prefer the status quo if and only if:
p>
q(1 − τ)
1 − q + q(1 − τ)
.
4Notice that we are not imposing any constraint on the maximization problem. This
implies in principle that agents can sell an amount of securities greater than their pre-tax
endowment ending up paying a negative tax. As long as γ is not too small this will never














for τ < 1
2.




1 − q + q(1 − τ)
if and only if
h<1.
Therefore, we have the following Lemma:
Lemma 1 For any continuous distribution F (y), all active agents on the
market (y ≥ γ) strictly prefer the status quo.
Figure 1 depicts the demand schedule b∗ (y) as a function of y, in the case
of U (x)=x1−α−1
1−α , α =2 , τ = 1





.I t s h o w s
how agents react to policy uncertainty: rich(poor) agents buy(sell) a positive
amount of securities. ˜ y is the mean of the income distribution truncated at γ
and, in equilibrium, is equal to the income level of the indiﬀerent agent on the
m a r k e t .A l s on o t i c et h a ta ni n c r e a s ei nγ induces a reduction, in equilibrium,
of the total amount of securities traded and therefore a reduction of the size
of the market.











If individuals whose incomes are in the left tail of the distribution cannot
access the market the resulting excess in demand will increase the security
10p r i c e .A tt h en e wp r i c ea g e n t sw i t hi n c o m eb e l o wt h em e a na r em o r et h a n
compensated by private transfers and therefore they strictly prefer the status
quo scenario. The utility ratio between redistribution and status quo does
n o td e p e n do nt h ei n c o m el e v e la n d ,s i n c e˜ y>¯ y, all voters for which y ≥ γ
vote for the status quo.
Figure 2 depicts the diﬀerence DU in utility between the status quo and
the redistribution state as a function of y, using the same parametrization of
Figure 1. Notice that when γ is set equal to 1
4, DU > 0 for y>1
4.T h ec h o -
sen parametrization aﬀects the shape of DU, but not its quasi-monotonicity

















redistributive policy will be:
˜ q =P r
½




=m i n{F (γ),F(a)} ≤ q.
Therefore, we have the following Lemma:
5F o re x a m p l ei nt h ec a s eo f
U (x)=l nx,
DU is ﬂat for y>γ.
11Lemma 2 For any continuous distribution F (y), the ex-post probability ˜ q
of voting against the status quo is weakly smaller than the ex-ante probability
q, and an increase in the size of market (a decrease in γ) weakly decreases
the support for the reform.
In the appendix I show that the ex-post probability ˜ q of voting against the
status quo is strictly smaller than the ex-ante probability q when we explicitly
consider the existence of individual budget constraints on the amount of
securities that can be traded.
To analyze the eﬀect of the initial income distribution on ˜ q, assume that

















In the case in which we shut down the political insurance market, the
probability of adopting the reform is given by:
q =1− (1 − ∆)
1
∆ .
An increase in ∆, that increases the Gini index as well as the ratio be-
tween mean and median income, unambiguously increases q. T h i si sw h a t
a standard median voter type of model would have predicted. A reform
with asymmetric beneﬁt will be more popular the more polarized is society
provided that a majority of voters was already in favor of it.
The comparative statics of the model are quite diﬀe r e n ti fw ec o n s i d e rt h e
role of the market. Indeed, the end of period probability of implementing
6The same analysis holds if we assume instead a log normal distribution. Both the
Pareto and the log normal distributions are reasonable approximations of the US empirical
distribution of income and have particularly useful properties. See Lee and Roemer (2001)
and Benabou (2000).













1 − (1 − ∆)
1
∆ γ > c
1−∆
.



















∆2 > 0 γ > c
1−∆
.
Increasing inequality has two distinct eﬀects on the actual support for redis-
tribution : it changes the relative position of the median voter with respect
to the mean voter and, for given γ, it changes the proportion of agents active
in the market. In the case in which the existence of the market reduces the
proportion of agents in favor of redistribution (i.e. γ < c
1−∆ =¯ y)a ni n c r e a s e
in inequality decreases the likelihood of adopting the reform.
4 Expected Income Distribution
An important feature of this model is that private redistribution takes place
before the election, even in the case in which the reform is ultimately not
implemented. The objective of this section is to analyze the eﬀect of the
political insurance market on the inequality of the expected income distribu-
tion after policy uncertainty is resolved. To avoid unnecessary complication
we will focus on the case of logarithmic utility.
We can compare the degree of inequality of diﬀerent income distributions
using the concept of second order stochastic dominance. Fx, is more unequal
than Fy if Fx is a mean preserving spread of Fy. More formally, let X be the










(Fx − Fy)ds ≥ 0 for all x ∈ X,( 1 )







Hence if Fx and Fy cross only once (1) is satisﬁed.
Let z be the expected income after elections without market.
z = qτ¯ y +( 1− qτ)y.

























=0 , and they cross only once, F is a mean preserving spread
of Fz.W ew i l lu s eFz as a benchmark to evaluate the eﬀect of the market in
terms of expected income distribution.
We have to consider two cases:
• case 1: γ ≥ ¯ y
In this case the electoral market does not aﬀect the probability of adopting
the reform. Let zmkt be the expected income after elections with market, and
Fzmkt be the expected income distribution.
Lemma 3 If γ ≥ ¯ y, the introduction of the electoral market decreases ex-
pected income inequality for any continuous initial distribution F.
The proof can be found in the appendix. Figure 3 provides the intuition.
Fzmkt and Fz have the same support, and are identical for y<γ. Since they
h a v et h es a m em e a n ,a r e a sA and B are equivalent. But this implies that Fz
is a mean preserving spread of Fzmkt.
• case 2: γ < ¯ y
In this case the eﬀect of the electoral market is twofold: it redistributes
income through private transfers before the reform takes place, and it aﬀects
the probability of adopting the reform.















Lemma 4 If γ < ¯ y, there exists a γ∗ ∈ (0, ¯ y),s u c ht h a ti fγ ≤ γ∗ the
introduction of the electoral market increases expected income inequality for
any continuous initial distribution F.
The proof is in the appendix. Figure 4 provides a graphical intuition in
t h ec a s eo fγ ≤ γ∗.I fγ ≤ γ∗,i ti sp o s s i b l et os h o wt h a tFzmkt and Fz cross
only once. Since they have the same mean we can conclude that Fzmkt is
a mean preserving spread of Fz.F o r γ ∈ (γ∗, ¯ y), Fzmkt and Fz cross twice,
hence they cannot be compared using the second order stochastic dominance
criterion.
When the ﬁnancial market is widely accessible, a large redistribution is
actually taking place before the election and, as we showed above, this maps
in a smaller support for the redistribution state. Therefore we should expect
a positive eﬀect of the political insurance market on expected inequality. The
lesson we get from this section is that this might not be the case. Even if a
large proportion of agents are moving resources from one state to the other,
as long as the lower tail of the distribution is still completely exposed to the
electoral risk, the gap between losers and winners widens and, moreover, we
are shifting probability mass on the status quo. When the political insurance
market is large, agents’ reaction to electoral uncertainty leads, in expectation,
to a distribution even less equal.













The main lesson we learned from the theoretical model is that if markets
provide insurance against political uncertainty, agents’ reaction to uncer-
tainty will be an important component of the equilibrium demand for redis-
tributive policies. The natural question that arises is: do political insurance
markets exist? This is the focus of the next section.
5 Presidential Portfolios
The 2000 US Presidential election provides a natural opportunity to study
the existence of a political insurance market for several reasons. First, it was
a very close election with no incumbent. Uncertainty about the identity of
the winner lasted until mid December and George W. Bush’s ﬁnal victory
was determined by a handful of votes.7 Second, the expected policies of the
two candidates were clearly diﬀerent on crucial issues like ﬁscal policy, and
defense and drug administration policies.8 Finally, the press for the ﬁrst time
7T h eS u p r e m eC o u r t ’ sﬁnal decision about Florida recount was taken on December
12th.
8Based on proposed income tax policies, Deloitte and Touche calculated that a four-
member family with annual income of $30,000 ($50,000) was expected to get approximately
$123 more ($1682 less) in case of a Gore victory with respect to a Bush victory.
16devoted large attention to the issue of election related investing strategies.
We construct presidential portfolios composed by selected stocks that can
be anticipated to fare diﬀerently under the alternative candidates and inves-
tigate to what extent the price movements of these portfolios are correlated
with electoral polls in the period before the elections are held. We expect
that if agents react to electoral uncertainty by trading electoral securities, we
should observe a correlation between portfolios’ excess returns and changes
in the expected probability of a Bush victory. How do we select the stocks to
be included in each presidential candidate portfolio? The strategy we follow
to construct these portfolios is to use data about campaign contributions and
select stocks of ﬁrm that satisfy three conditions: i) they made signiﬁcant
contributions to candidates’ campaign in the 2000 election cycle, ii) the con-
tributions were concentrated on one candidate in particular, iii) ﬁrm’s stocks
were traded on the NYSE during year 2000. We considered both hard money
and soft money contributions. The well-known problem that arise when us-
ing soft money contribution data is that is not easy to distinguish between
funds that are used to ﬁnance the presidential campaign and funds used for
other party expenditures. Nonetheless, since our main interest is to select
ﬁrms with a strong preference for one policy platform with respect to the
other, we believe that the choice of considering total party contributions is
a plausible approximation.9 Table 1 lists the top ten contributors for each
party that gave more than 2
3 of their total contributions to a single party.
Using campaign contributions as a selection criterion has two nice fea-
tures: it exploits the ﬁrm expectations about the future states, and makes
the selection possible from an ex-ante point of view, using information readily
available to the general public. It is worth noticing that the stocks selected
are roughly a subset of the so called ”Bush Stocks” and ”Gore Stocks” that
Prudential Securities and Lehman Brothers, among others, picked during
the 2000 US presidential election campaign. They are also part of the basket
options issued by the Swiss ﬁrm Vontobel the day after the elections.
As a proxy for the probability of each candidate being elected we use
lagged daily data from the Iowa Political Stock Market. The IPSM is an
experimental market operated by the University of Iowa. In the ”winner-
take-all market” internet traders can buy or sell candidate shares that pay
9A possible alternative is to distinguish between soft money contributions to Party
National Committees and other contributions. This strategy addresses the problem only
partially and requires an additional amount of information that is not readily available to
the general public.
17$1 if the candidate wins and zero otherwise. The Iowa Political Stock Market
has not only been shown to be particularly accurate in predicting the election
outcome but also has been already used in several empirical studies as poll
proxy.10 We use the daily closing price of the Bush contract, normalized to
eliminate the eﬀect of third candidates running.
We construct two weighted portfolios composed by the stocks listed in
Table 1. Each index is an average of the daily closing price of ten stocks
traded on NYSE. Weights are constructed using the number of outstand-
ing shares. Figure 5 plots the series of the two presidential indexes for the
period 5/1/2000 to 11/6/2000. Both series are normalized to unity in date
5/1/2000. Figure 6 plots the Iowa Political Stock Market closing price of a
Bush contract for the same time period. Two observations can be derived
from simple inspection of Figures 5 and 6. First, the two presidential port-
folios are negatively correlated, in particular from September 2000 to the
election day. Second, there is evidence of non-stationarity of the series. The
results of the ADF tests showed in Table 2 in the appendix suggest that we
can deal with the non-stationarity issue by considering rate of returns.
The rates of return of the Bush and Gore indexes in the period 5/1/2000-
11/6/2000 were respectively 4.6 percent and -4.6 percent. In the same period
t h eS & P 5 0 0i n d e xf e l lb y2 . 5p e r c e n t . O nA u g u s t1 8 t h ,o n ed a ya f t e rA l
Gore’s speech at the Democratic National Convention in which he accused
the major pharmaceuticals ﬁrms of overcharging the public, the Bush index
fell by 1.7 percent and Pﬁzer alone fell by 2.9 percent. On December 12th,
when all uncertainty was ﬁnally resolved, the Bush index rose by 0.8 percent
while the Gore index fell by 0.7 percent.
To test whether the daily returns of presidential portfolios are correlated
with changes in the expected probability of a Bush victory we estimate a
simple CAPM model of the form:
Pt = α + β1SPt + β2PROB t−1 + εt,
where all variables are expressed in natural logarithm of daily returns, and:
P = daily return of presidential portfolio
SP = daily return of Standard & Poor 500
PROB = daily return of the probability of a Bush election (IPSM).
10See Forsythe et al. (1991, 1992) for the anatomy of the IPSM.
18Given the short time span we can assume a constant risk-free asset return
that will be captured by the intercept α. We included the daily return of
Standard & Poor 500 in order to control for factors that aﬀected overall
returns. Moreover, because of the fact that the IPSM is open for trading
24 hours a day, we considered one period lagged daily changes of the Bush
contract closing price.
Tables 3 and 4 in the Appendix show the results of the estimates for
each portfolio. We estimate the equation both by OLS and, to reduce the
eﬀect of possible outliers given the small sample, by LAD (least absolute
deviations). Analysis conducted on the residuals show no evidence of serious
misspeciﬁcation problems.11 The coeﬃcient of PROB is signiﬁcant and has
the expected sign for both portfolios. This suggests that as the likelihood of
a Bush victory increases the return of the Bush portfolio is increasing as well
while the return of the Gore portfolio is decreasing.
There is an important caveat in interpreting our results. A positive cor-
relation between a Bush victory and the Bush portfolio’s return is only a
necessary condition to conjecture that agents are hedging political risk. The
same correlation would be observed if agents are simply betting on the win-
ner. What we have shown is that stocks currently traded on the market can
actually be used to hedge policy risk without the need of resorting to partic-
ularly sophisticated ﬁnancial instruments. Moreover, the selection strategy
suggested is a particularly intuitive and simple one. As long as this kind of
political securities can be constructed we are in a world similar to the one
described in the previous sections.
We now focus our attention to explore empirically some of the predictions
of our theoretical model.
6 Financial Market Participation and Sup-
port for Redistributive Policies
Based on the model presented in this paper and the evidence we have shown
in the previous section, it is our claim that the level of participation in
the stock market should be negatively related to support for policies with
redistributive content. The purpose of this section is to explore this relation
11There is some evidence of heteroskedasticity in the Gore regression. Nonetheless, by
using a White estimator, the coeﬃcient of PROBis still signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
19and provide some suggestive evidence both at an aggregate and individual
level that corroborates our claim.
Figures 7 depicts a cross-country scatter plot of the relation between pro-
portion of households owning stocks in 1998, and social security transfers to
households (Sst) as a share of the GDP, for all countries where individual
stock ownership data exist. The sample includes the US and six European
countries that account for 90% of overall EU ﬁnancial wealth in year 2000.12
Not surprisingly, European countries are characterized by smaller partici-
pation in the stock market and larger redistributive transfers with respect
to the US. What is more interesting is that there is evidence of a negative
relation between stock market participation and redistribution.13 If we con-
sider only redistribution to elders (old age public pensions), the negative
relation is even more stark, as shown in Figure 8.14 Clearly, these ﬁgures
should be interpreted with a grain of salt, but are still suggestive of the fact
that economies’ ﬁnancial structure appears to be correlated with the policy
choices of a country.15
One possible explanation for the observation that households’ stockhold-
ing is larger in economies where the social security system is less generous
has to do with the demographic transition experienced by European coun-
tries. The idea is that the stock market provides a substitute for smaller
social security beneﬁts expected in the future. Our point is that this kind
of mechanism may be only one side of the story. As long as agents real-
ize that policy platforms with diﬀe r e n tr e d i s t r i b u t i v ec o n t e n ta r er e ﬂected
in stock market returns, their reaction to future uncertainty endogenously
makes public redistribution less appealing.
If we focus on the recent US experience, we can see that the propor-
tion of US households owning stocks has increased dramatically in the last
decade. Data from Surveys of Consumer Finances show that direct owner-
ship increased from 16.2 percent of households in 1989 to 21.3 percent in
12We consider both direct ownership and stocks owned through mutual funds or individ-
ual retirement accounts. In the case of Germany, only direct ownership data are available.
Sst/GDP is an average for the period 1995-1999. Data are taken form OECD Economic
Outlook and Guiso et al. (2002, 2003).
13The relation exists in spite of the presence of a clear outlier, represented by Sweden.
14Old age public pensions (Oapp)/GDP is an average for the period 1995-1997.
15We have comparable data for only seven economies and the countries selected are
particularly diﬀerent in their electoral system. As Persson , Roland and Tabellini (2000)
show, there is a close relation between countries’ electoral systems and the size of the
public sector.
202001, mutual fund ownership increased from 7.1 percent in 1989 to 27.7 per-
cent in 2001, and in 2001, 52.2 percent of US households had a tax-deferred
retirement account. As a result, the proportion of US households owning
stocks directly or indirectly (through mutual funds or retirement accounts)
rose from 31.6 percent in 1989 to 51.9 percent in 2001. Even if ownership has
always been very concentrated in the upper tail of both income and wealth
distributions, the median income of stock owners has decreased by more than
9 percent in the period 1989-1998 and there is evidence of a shift in portfolios’
composition towards more diversiﬁcation.16
Table 5 reports the share of social security transfers over GDP for the
US in the period 1990-2000. The amount of resources devoted to social se-
curity spending has been constantly decreasing since 1992. A similar picture
emerges if we consider broader aggregates that include transfers to households
and subsidies. Moreover, taking for granted the conventional wisdom that
democratic platforms tend to carry more redistributive spending, the share
of democratic votes in House elections decreased from 52 percent in 1990 to
47 percent in 2000. Given that the 90’s were also characterized by increasing
inequality in income distribution, the combination of increasing stock mar-
ket participation and decreasing support for redistribution suggests that the
mechanism described in our theoretical model may be actually at work.
Clearly, any relation between stock market participation and preference
for redistribution we can infer from aggregate data may very well turn out to
be spurious and due to a variety of other phenomenon. To explore this issue
further, we therefore focus on micro level data from the National Election
Study (NES). The 2000-2002 waves of the NES contain individual level infor-
mation about stock market participation. Respondents were asked: ”do you
personally, or jointly with a spouse, have any money invested in the stock
market right now either in an individual stock or in a mutual fund?”. In
order to measure preferences over redistribution we use an index variable
that summarizes individual preferences on whether the government should
increase or decrease the amount of spending on Welfare programs like social
security.17 We construct a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if respondent
16See Bertaut and Starr-McCluer (2002).
17Alternatively, one could look at preferences revealed by the vote cast in the election.
There are two problems in using this alternative approach. First, one should take into
account the selection bias due to the choice of voting versus abstention in the election.
Second, it is not clear which type of election one should focus on, and how incumbency
eﬀects should be treated. Since our theoretical model does not address the choice of
21prefers less than or equal social security spending with respect to the status
quo, and equal to 0 otherwise.
Given the positive correlation between stock ownership and income, we
try to separate the two eﬀects by grouping respondents by income quintiles.
Table 6, reports the proportion of respondents in the sample that prefer
less than or equal federal spending in social security with respect to the
status quo by income quintiles and stock ownership status. Notice that in
every quintile the proportion of stock owners is systematically higher than
the proportion of those without stocks. The same picture emerges if we
consider diﬀerent measures of preference for redistribution like preference for
reduction of services and spending.
In order to distinguish the eﬀect that market participation has on prefer-
ence for redistribution from other socioeconomic characteristics, we estimate
a probit model that controls for income, sex, race, age and education. The
results of the estimates are in Table 7. Stock ownership increases the prob-
ability that an individual will prefer a lower or equal level of redistribution
in the form of social security spending by 5 percentage points in the 2000
sample and, by almost 10 percentage points in the 2002 sample. Since the
2002 wave contains a subsample of individuals that were already present in
the 2000 wave, we can get additional evidence by exploiting the panel dimen-
sion of the data set. For example, in the subset of individuals that reported
no stock in 2000 and become stock owners in 2002, 73 percent of individuals
did not change their preference for redistribution. Among the remaining 27
percent, almost three quarter of individuals switched their preference toward
less redistribution. The opposite happens if we focus on individuals that
were stock owners in 2000 and reported no stock in 2002. The results of
the estimates of a random eﬀects probit model that incorporate the panel
d i m e n s i o na r es h o w ni nT a b l e8 .T h ec o e ﬃcient of stock ownership has the
expected sign, and it is signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. In general, the
results are very similar to those obtained by estimating separate regressions.
7C o n c l u s i o n
Our model shows the role citizens’ reactions to policy uncertainty plays in
the demand for redistributive policies. We show how ex-ante uncertainty
turning out to the poll, we choose to focus on variables that are not directly related to the
elections.
22about a government policy with redistributive consequences will inﬂuence
the proportion of agents in favor of it, if a subset of agents can trade pol-
icy contingent securities. In an economy with a political insurance market,
there is less demand for redistribution than in one without such a market,
and demand for redistribution decreases as income inequality increases. We
provide conditions under which the existence of a political insurance market
increases future expected inequality even if a large proportion of agents is
redistributing resources through private transfers.
We show that stocks currently traded on the market can actually be used
to hedge policy risk, and we provide preliminary evidence for the existence of
an empirical relation between participation in the stock market and support
for policies with redistributive content.
Our future research agenda has to address two important questions. First,
do people hedge policy risk? Second, does the structure of political institu-
tions aﬀect the likelihood that a political insurance market exists?
Given that in the US the majority of stock owners participate in the mar-
ket through their mutual fund holdings, a promising avenue for addressing
the ﬁrst question is to explore the CDA Spectrum database. This database
provides information on each stock owned by mutual funds for each calendar
quarter.18 As an example, it is possible to see that before the 2000 Presi-
dential election the Vanguard Health Care fund, a ﬁve star rating fund from
Morningstar.com, decreased by 6765001 units its stock holdings of Pﬁzer but
then after the election bought back 1750000 stocks. It is interesting to note
that Pﬁzer was a “Bush stock”, and the performance of pharmaceuticals-
oriented funds would presumably have been harmed by a Gore presidency.
The second question to explore has to do with the fact that a political
insurance market is more likely to be sustainable in a political system where
the diﬀerent policy options and their consequences are clearly identiﬁable ex-
ante. This is more likely in political systems where, for example, bargaining
over government formation is minimal or absent, as in the US system. As
a result institutional design may have an indirect eﬀect on which policy will
ultimately be adopted, a consequence completely novel to the ﬁndings of the
existent literature on comparative political institution and redistribution.
18One problem of using the Spectrum database is the so called “window-dressing” prac-
tice. Since the information available is only a snapshot every quarter, funds managers
might choose to readjust their portfolio holdings just before data are released.
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8 Appendix
In the paper all the results were derived in the case of exogenously restricted
access to market and without taking into account the possibility that agents’
budget constraint was binding. Here we show that, under some assumptions,
the results derived in the previous sections are robust to the introduction of a
budget constraint when we set γ =y
¯
(i.e. unrestricted access to the ﬁnancial
25market). We restrict attention to the case of y ∼ U [0,1],a n dl o g a r i t h m i c
utility function. We ﬁnally assume τ ≤ 1
2.19
Given that income is distributed uniformly, q is equal to 1
2.T h e n e w
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Is a matter of simple algebra to check that all agents with income y>
τ2−2s(1−τ)
2τ , will prefer the status quo outcome. Therefore the support for
redistribution will be:
˜ q =
τ2 − 2s(1 − τ)
2τ
,
always smaller than q = 1
2.
Notice that the above exercise implicitly assume that agents take q as
given. If agents can perfectly anticipate the eﬀect of the ﬁnancial market
they will consider the expected ˜ q in the maximization problem. Nonetheless,
19If τ is close to one there are two equilibrium prices that clear the market. Since the
qualitative results are going to be the same irrespective of the equilibrium selected, we
restrict attention to the case of τ ≤ 1
2.
26when τ ≤ 1
2, it can be shown that a unique equilibrium exists in which the
proportion of agents in favor of redistribution is always strictly smaller than
in case the in which agents cannot react to electoral uncertainty.
P r o o fo fL e m m a1
Let zm be the expected income after elections with market, and Fzm be
the expected income distribution.
zm =
(
(y(˜ y(1 − τ)+τ¯ y(1 − q)) + ˜ yqτ¯ y)
qτ¯ y+˜ y(1−τq)
(τ¯ y+˜ y(1−τ))˜ y for y ≥ γ
qτ¯ y +( 1− qτ)y otherwise,
Fzm = 
     




(τ ¯ y+˜ y(1−τ))˜ y
qτ ¯ y+˜ y(1−τq) −˜ yqτ¯ y
˜ y(1−τ)+τ¯ y(1−q)
¶
zm ≥ ¯ z








qτ¯ y +( 1− qτ)y
¯
,qτa +( 1− qτ)γ
¢
0 zm <q τ¯ y +( 1− qτ)y
¯
,
where ¯ z =
(γ(˜ y(1−τ)+τ¯ y(1−q))+˜ yqτ¯ y)(τ¯ yq+˜ y(1−τq))
(τ¯ y+˜ y(1−τ))˜ y .N o t i c e t h a t f o ry<γ, Fz and
Fzm are identical. For y ≥ γ, they cross ones in y =˜ y and, Fz (¯ z) >
Fzm (¯ z)=F (γ). Since the existence of the market does not aﬀect the mean











(Fz − Fzmkt)ds ≥ 0 for all y ∈ Y .
P r o o fo fL e m m a2
Let z0
m be the expected income after elections with market , and Fz0
m be
the expected income distribution when γ < ¯ y.I nt h i sc a s et h ee n do fp e r i o d
probability of implementing the reform ˜ q is a function of the size the market,





(y(˜ y(1 − τ)+τ¯ y(1 − q)) + ˜ yτ¯ yq)
τ¯ y˜ q+˜ y(1−τ˜ q)
(τ¯ y+˜ y(1−τ))˜ y for y ≥ γ
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˜ qτ¯ y +( 1− ˜ qτ)y
¯
, ˜ qτ¯ y +( 1− ˜ qτ)γ
¢
0 z0
m < ˜ qτ¯ y +( 1− ˜ qτ)y
¯
,
where ¯ z0 =
(γ(˜ y(1−τ)+τ¯ y(1−q))+˜ yqτ¯ y)(τ¯ y˜ q+˜ y(1−τ˜ q))
(τ¯ y+˜ y(1−τ))˜ y .I n t h i s c a s e Fz0
m >F z in the
left tail of the distribution since ˜ q<q .M o r e o v e r ,Fz (¯ z0) >F z0
m (¯ z0).T og e t
the desired result we have to check whether the two distribution functions
cross only ones. A necessary and suﬃcient condition for single crossing is:
˜ qτ¯ y(1 − q) − ˜ y(q − ˜ q)(1− τ) ≤ 0.
Let
Q(γ)=˜ qτ¯ y(1 − q) − ˜ y(q − ˜ q)(1− τ),
and notice that:









1 − ˜ q
((1 − ˜ q)τ¯ y(1 − q)+( γ (q − ˜ q)+˜ y(1 − q))(1 − τ)) > 0.
Therefore there exists a unique γ∗ such that for γ < γ∗, Fz is a mean
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30Table 1. Campaign Contributions
Republicans Democrats
Philip Morris 3,814,051 $     Goldman Sachs 4,337,167 $    
United Parcel Service 2,918,969 $     Time Warner 2,352,205 $    
Enron Corp 2,500,058 $     Loral Space & Communications 1,528,200 $    
Pfizer Inc 2,472,166 $     FleetBoston Financial 1,353,225 $    
Bristol-Myers Squibb 2,364,412 $     Vyyo Inc 1,339,000 $    
Union Pacific Corp 1,858,194 $     Slim-Fast Foods/Thompson Medical 1,196,950 $    
GlaxoSmithKline 1,796,893 $     Bear Stearns 1,190,879 $    
WorldCom Inc 1,786,370 $     Cablevision Systems 1,022,604 $    
UST Inc 1,605,652 $     Vivendi Universal 985,730 $       
Southern Co 1,405,316 $     Viacom Inc 960,075 $       
Note: Top ten campaign contributors with stock publicy traded on NYSE, that gave more than two thirds 
of total contributions to one party.
Source: ICPRS and Common Cause 2000 Election Cycle
Figure 9:
Table 2. Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test for Unit Root
Variable No Drift Included Drift and Trend Included
Bush Portfolio Index -3.03
Ln(Bush Index return) -5.79**
Gore Portfolio Index -2.15
Ln(Gore Index return) -11.5**
Standard & Poor 500 -2.19
Ln(Standard & Poor return) -5.04**
Iowa Political Stock Market -0.76
Ln(Iowa PSM return) -11.8**
Lag selection based on AIC. ** (*) indicates rejection of the null of nonstationarity at the 1% (5%) level.
Figure 10:












t-statistics are reported in brackets. ** (*), indicates that 
the coefficient is statistically different from zero at the 1%(5%) level.
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t-statistics are reported in brackets. ** (*), indicates that 
the coefficient is statistically different from zero at the 1%(5%) level.
Figure 12:
Table 5. Redistribution in the US 1990-2000








33Table 6. Preference for Redistribution
Year 2000 2002
Stock Ownership 0 1 0 1
I Income Quintile 24.49 41.38 24.21 26.32
II Income Quintile 25.33 33.8 26.74 35.51
III Income Quintile 29.11 33.33 26.74 41.38
IV Income Quintile 33.02 40.86 30.38 43.93
V Income Quintile 26.47 55.96 40 54.59
Note: proportion of respondents that prefers less than or equal federal
spending on social  security with respect to the status quo by income
quintiles and stock ownership status. Stock ownership is equal to 1 if 
respondent has any money invested in the stock market either in an 
individual stock or in a mutual fund.
Figure 14:
34Table 7. Probit Regressions: Preference for Redistribution
2000 2002
Stock Owner 0.0565 0.0963
[0.0305]* [0.0335]***
II Income Quintile -0.0348 0.0214
[0.0431] [0.0599]
III Income Quintile -0.365 0.0423
[0.0494] [0.0640]
IV Income Quintile 0.0099 0.0623
[0.0472] [0.0630]












No. Obs. 1473 1260
Pseudo R2 0.0599 0.0522
LR Chi2 (10) 115.01 87.9
Note: Independent variable is equal to 1 if respondent prefers less than or equal federal
spending on social  security with respect to the status quo. The coefficients indicate the 
change in the probability for an infinitesimal change in each independent, continuous 
variable and the discrete change in the probability for dummy variables. 
Standard errors are in brackets. * (**, ***) indicates that the coefficient is statistically 
different from zero at the 10% (5%, 1%) level.
Figure 15:




II Income Quintile 0.1177
[0.1927]
III Income Quintile 0.2816
[0.2147]
IV Income Quintile 0.3757
[0.2093]*
















Wald Chi2 (10) 92.16
Note: Independent variable is equal to 1 if respondent prefers less than or equal federal
spending on social  security with respect to the status quo, and equal to 0 otherwise. 
Standard errors are in brackets. * (**, ***) indicates that the coefficient is statistically 
different from zero at the 10% (5%, 1%) level.
Figure 16:
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